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Abstract 
This paper presents a procedure for computing homogeneous measures of credit risk 
from stocks, bonds and CDSs. The measures are based on bond spreads (BS), CDS spreads 
(CDS) and implied stock market credit spreads (ICS). We compute these measures for a 
sample of North American and European firms and find that in most cases, the stock market 
leads the credit risk discovery process with respect to bond and CDS markets. 
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There are many the economic agents who dedicate time and effort to estimating 
company credit risk. A few examples being: corporate bondholders, large investment banks 
ready to cover the risk that bondholders could experience through the sale of bond 
derivatives, such as Credit Default Swaps (CDSs), or shareholders worried about the interests 
that their company might have to face when the credit rating deteriorates1. Each of these 
assets (bonds, CDSs and shares) are traded in markets that differ in terms of organization 
(greater weight of organized markets in the case of shares, less weight in the bond market, and 
a clear domination of OTC markets for CDSs), liquidity (the stock market is generally the 
most liquid, followed by the bond market and the CDS market) and traders (the stock market 
probably has the highest proportion of least professional traders, followed by the bond 
market, and the CDS characterized by professional brokers and traders): three characteristics 
which are possibly not independent. 
 
Because credit risk affects all these assets, information available about this risk 
eventually shows in their prices. However, given the structural differences between the 
markets we have described, it may be possible that such information appears in some prices 
with greater speed than in others. In this essay we develop a methodology that allows the 
evaluation of which of these prices, that is, which of these markets, incorporates this 
information first. We also apply the proposed methodology to a sample of North American 
and European companies.  
 
When it comes to comparing the speed with which different markets incorporate new 
information in relation to credit risk, the following steps should be considered. Firstly, to 
formally define what is understood by the term ‘credit risk’. Secondly, to propose a 
quantitative variable that measures the perception that a certain market has of this risk in 
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accordance with the given definition. Thirdly, to develop procedures and techniques to 
estimate the chosen variable given the available information for each market. And finally, to 
define a methodology to analyze the discovery process. 
 
We may define credit risk as “risk created by loss associated with the default of the 
borrower, or the event of credit rating deterioration”. Given that loss due to credit rating 
deterioration (downgrading) is a loss that stems from an increase in risk due to losses 
associated with the failure to pay, the key element is the possibility of failure (default). It 
seems therefore that a reasonable measure of the credit risk perceived by a certain market for 
the specific case of a particular company is the premium that agents in that market would 
claim for the debt with possibility of failure, in relation to a debt of the same nature but 
without possibility of failure. It seems natural on the other hand to name this premium the 
credit spread. Although it may not be reasonable to expect that different markets assign very 
different credit spreads to the same company on a permanent basis (as it would induce 
arbitrage opportunities), it is possible that such differences appear in the short run due to the 
structural differences between the markets described previously. 
 
 Of the three markets mentioned, the one in which the definition of the credit spread 
variable results more intuitive is perhaps the bond market. In principle, it would be enough to 
subtract from the bond yield of a particular company, the yield of an equivalent debt 
instrument without default risk, or the equivalent rate. This in fact fully corresponds to the 
variable that we wish to estimate. The problem is that such an equivalent rate simply does not 
exist. Traditionally Government bond yields have been used, however, corporate-Government 
yield spreads are explained only in part by the fact that Government bonds are seen as free 
from credit risk and corporate bonds are not. On one hand certain legal requirements induce 
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the demand for Government bonds (Hull, Predescu and White (2004)), which tends to put 
their yield below the ideal equivalent rate. In recent years this factor has taken on greater 
relevance due to shocks in the bond supply (Reinhart and Sack (2001)). It can be gathered that 
Government bonds are generally more liquid than corporate bonds (Longstaff, Mithal and 
Neis (2005), and Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2005)) and have better tax treatment (Elton, 
Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001)), which also reduces their yields in comparison to our 
hypothetical equivalent rate. As a result, the use of Government bonds as an approximation 
would mean that the price assigned to credit risk in that market, that is, the credit spread, was 
probably overestimated. 
 
An alternative which seems to provide better results is to use the swap rate, or fixed 
rate that is received as compensation for providing a floating rate, adjusted to the Libor 
(Reinhart and Sack (2001)). Hull, Predescu and White (2004), Longstaff, Mithal and Neis 
(2005), Houweling and Vorst (2005), and Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) show that when 
swap rates are deducted from corporate bond yields instead of Government bond yields, the 
estimated premiums come closer to CDS spreads. As the spreads of the CDSs ‘essentially’ 
represent the price assigned to credit risk in this market, and it being unreasonable to expect 
systematic differences in the price given to such risk in different markets, we can conclude 
that the use of swap rates aids (at least to some extent) in extracting the credit risk component 
of bond yields. Two additional reasons can explain this result: Firstly, swap rates are not 
affected by legal requirements; and secondly, unlike Government bond yields swap rates are 
lacking in any special tax effect (Hull, Predescu and White (2004)). Despite these advantages, 
corporate bond yields still have on average a greater liquidity component than swap rates 
(Reinhart and Sack (2001)) and therefore, generally, these tend to be below the equivalent 
rate. One way to minimize this discrepancy is to select the most recently issued bonds. These 
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being the most traded, their equivalent rate has a lower liquidity component and comes closer 
to swap rates. Given this information, we understand that by subtracting the corresponding 
swap rate from the yield of the most recently issued corporate bonds, a more reasonable 
estimation of the credit spread in the bond market is obtained, than by using Government 
bond yields. 
 
On the other hand we have the relatively new CDS market. A standard CDS is 
basically an insurance contract through which an agent, the insured, makes periodical 
payments to another agent, the insurer, until the time that either the contract expires or the 
bond in reference in the contract fails, whichever happens first. In the event of the contract 
expiring without the bond failing, the insurer does not make any payment to the insured. In 
the event of the bond failing before the contract expires, the insurer compensates the insured 
for the difference between the face value and the bond market value after the failure and the 
contract is liquidated. The premium of the CDS, that is, the constant rate λ on the face value 
of the bond paid by the insured to the insurer as a quota for the protection, directly gives us a 
quite reasonable measurement of the credit risk price estimated by traders in this market. In 
effect, an equivalent definition for the variable that we have termed credit spread in relation 
to a certain company is the premium that agents in that market would be ready to pay when 
they have a debt with that company, to convert such a debt into a debt of the same nature, but 
without the possibility of default, which is precisely what λ represents. 
 
There are however various reasons explaining why λ may differ from the price that 
we wish to estimate. For example, let us suppose that the bond in reference has a face value of 
100. The insured then possesses a put option on the bond, with ‘strike’ equal to 100 and 
which is executable in the event of default. If a bond market value below 100 is justified only 
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by its credit quality, then the CDS premium represents the credit spread in this market. 
However, within what we have generically termed ‘default’, possible restructurings are 
included in which not all debt instruments are necessarily liquidated. If there are reasons that 
have nothing to do with credit risk, but which justify the bond value being below 100 
(liquidity concerns, long maturity, special clauses such as a conversion clause), then the CDS 
gives the insured, in the case of restructuring, the option to sell a bond that may be worth 80, 
for 100. This can happen even though a default has not been strictly produced, and although 
the price is not justified by the credit quality of the bond in question. Logically, the CDS 
premium will be higher than the premium that would be fixed solely for credit risk. 
Furthermore, the CDSs do not generally establish a bond, but a portfolio of reference bonds, 
generating by this means a ‘cheapest-to-deliver option’. However, the entirety of deliverable 
assets has been limited since May 2001 for North American CDSs (Blanco, Brennan and 
Marsh (2005)), tending to eliminate from the portfolio those bonds that, due to their special 
nature, could be traded with a substantial discount with regards to their face value, and to 
reconcile the CDS premium with the premium that strictly corresponds to the credit risk price 
in this market.  
 
Other considerations, which can also deviate the CDS premium with regards to the 
premium that would be established solely for credit risk, have to do with the possibility that 
the contract fixes a final premium payment in the event of failure, prior to the exchange of 
bonds, and that said exchange is carried out at a price that may or may not include the accrued 
interests as well as the face value. These elements, however, seem to have a marginal effect 
on the CDS premiums2.  
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So, finally, it may be that the CDS premium does not exactly represent the credit 
spread in this market, but we can assume that in the majority of cases it is a reasonable 
approximation. 
 
Our last market is the stock market. In this case, the price that traders give to credit 
risk is not exactly explicit, and it becomes necessary to use a theoretical model which, based 
on stock market values and other financial data, enables us to derive the price that is 
implicitly assigned to company credit risk. 
 
Merton (1974) was the first to establish a relationship between the market value of 
bonds and shares based on the theory of option pricing. His assumption of a zero coupon bond 
as the only debt instrument of the company opened the door to more elaborated models, the 
so-called structural models. A brief list of those that merit more attention include, of course, 
Merton (1974), but also Black and Cox (1976), Geske (1977), Leland (1994), Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995), and Leland and Toft (1996). 
 
The natural method of validating a structural model is to verify whether it is capable of 
generating theoretical premiums which are consistent, or not, with those traditionally 
observed in the bond market. This procedure is not exempt of difficulties, since in order to 
replicate the observed premiums there would be a need to introduce into the model all of 
those elements that help to explain such premiums, including for example liquidity risk (as we 
do not generally observe only the most liquid bonds), and, in the case of using Government 
bond yields as reference for the risk-free rate, a different taxation and even a demand for those 
bonds amplified by legal requirements3.  
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Assuming that we only expect structural models to produce reliable estimates of the 
pure credit spread, the use of Government bond yields as reference for the risk-free rate does 
not only have the effect of overestimating the benchmark credit spread (the one that should be 
replicated), it also produces a bias in the spread predicted by the model. In fact, structural 
models usually establish a negative relationship between credit spreads and risk-free rate 
(Leland (1994) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995)). This implies that if stock market 
participants perceive swap rates as the risk-free alternative to corporate bond yields, then the 
use of Government bond yields as an input in the model will also result in the predicted 
spread being overestimated. In short, if Government bond yields underestimate the reference 
risk-free rate for traders, then their use will overestimate both the credit spread in the bond 
market and that predicted by structural models in the stock market, making any comparison 
problematic.  
 
Another common problem in most structural models is how to determine the default 
barrier. In this sense we are typically left with two alternatives: either we exogenously fix this 
level as in Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), or we follow Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft 
(1996) and derive it endogenously as an optimal decision for stockholders. This second 
alternative seems clearly more attractive, but still leaves aside the influence that other factors, 
such as liquidity constraints (Davydenko (2005)), or the particular insolvency code the firm is 
subject to (Franks, Nyborg and Torous (1996)), may have on the default boundary. 
 
Alternative approaches have been proposed recently to test the predictions provided by 
different structural models. Under the view that corporate-Government yield spreads 
overestimate credit spreads, Huang and Huang (2003) test several structural models not 
according to their ability to replicate those spreads, but according to their ability to replicate 
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observed rates of default. They conclude that structural models are capable of replicating 
these rates of failure for reasonable parameter values, but that those same parameters imply 
premiums that are typically below the said spreads4. It is tempting therefore to conclude that 
premiums generated in this way are those really attributable to credit risk. However, the idea 
that the replication of observed default rates through a structural model directly leads to the 
replication of the unobserved credit spreads in the stock market, and by extension in the bond 
market, should be taken with caution. The risk of default (a probability of failure strictly 
greater than zero) is a necessary element for credit risk to exist, but it is not the only element 
that affects the final price. The expected recovery rate, for example, assumes a fundamental 
part of the credit risk price estimation and, however, may at least partially depend on 
parameters that are relatively independent from those that lead to the replication of default 
rates.  
 
In a more recent study, Eom, Helwege and Huang (2004) compare the bond spread 
prediction errors of different structural models, again using Government bond yields as 
reference for the risk-free rate. In this case model parameters are estimated for individual 
company data and not calibrated to match historical default rates by rating category as in 
Huang and Huang (2003). The main conclusion of their work is that structural models are not 
necessarily affected by premium under-prediction, but by precision. 
 
In this paper we propose a modified version of the Leland and Toft (1996) model 
(referred to as LT from here on). One main difference is that while bankruptcy costs remain as 
an important input for the value of individual bonds in our case, we show that they may be 
assumed equal to zero in the valuation of the whole company. This is justified by the fact that 
bankruptcy costs affect the distribution of the firm’s assets between different claimants in 
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case of default (debtholders and ‘lawyers’), but not the overall value of these assets; In this 
sense we follow Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001). Another important difference is that we do 
not determine the default boundary as the optimal choice for stockholders. Instead, we 
directly calibrate this input to the model according to the information available in the CDS 
market. In addition, and contrary to what has usually been done in previous studies, we 
consider the swap rate as the reference risk-free rate to determine theoretical credit spreads. 
We show that all this makes it possible to generate theoretical credit risk premiums which are 
consistent with those observed in bond and CDS markets, while at the same time produces 
quite reasonable values for the default boundary. This first main result of the paper suggests 
that the traditional poor performance of structural models may be due to the use of an 
inappropriate risk-free rate, and to an incomplete understating of the determinants of the 
default boundary. 
 
The relative speed with which different markets incorporate new information about 
companies’ credit risk, has been the focus of recent studies. Blanco, Brennan and Marsh 
(2005) analyze the case of the bond and CDS markets. They consider a sample of 33 North 
American and European firms and conclude that the CDS market heads the bond market. 
Although the effect of specific variables from the stock market is studied, the essay does not 
formally include the stock market as a third market in the analysis of price discovery. With 
respect to the methodology, they assume that credit spreads in both markets (bonds and 
CDSs) are co-integrated, which allows them to carry out the analysis using a vector error 
correction model (VECM). Certainly, such an approach is interesting, but rests on the idea 
that credit spreads in each market follow a non-stationary process, an assumption difficult to 
verify if time series have relatively short spans, like in their sample (approximately a year and 
a half).  
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In a parallel work, Zhu (2004) considers an international sample of 24 issuers and 
finds that the CDS market and the bond market appear equally important in the incorporation 
of new information about companies’ credit risk when the Granger causality test is 
implemented. When a VECM is used to analyze the price discovery process, results change 
indicating that the CDS market leads the bond market. Even though they consider a sample 
period of 4 years (from 1999 to 2002), more than 85% of the data come from the last two 
years, which may still result in a short period to test for non-stationarity. 
 
The first paper to formally incorporate the stock market as a third market was by 
Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2003), who propose a vector auto-regressive model (VAR) to 
analyze the lead-lag relations between weekly changes in CDS premiums, changes in bond 
spreads and stock returns. The leading process analysis is then performed by applying the 
Wald test over the coefficients of the lagged variables. With a sample of 68 North American 
companies for the period March 2001 – October 2002, they conclude that information flows 
first into the CDS and stock markets and then into the bond market. 
 
Norden and Weber (2005) use the same VAR model proposed by Longstaff, Mithal 
and Neis (2003) to analyze the comovement of CDS, bond and stock markets using a sample 
of 58 companies for the period 2000 – 2002. Their work differs from that of Longstaff, Mithal 
and Neis (2003) in that they consider not only weekly but also daily data, the risk-free rate 
used is the swap rate and not the US Treasury bond yield, and their sample is international. In 
addition, they perform a price discovery analysis for the case of the CDS and bond markets 
similar to that of Zhu (2004). The results in Norden and Weber (2005) support the idea that 
information flows first into the stock market, then into the CDS market, and finally into the 
bond market. The evidence for the leading role of the CDS market with respect to the bond 
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market is stronger in the case of North American companies than in the case of European 
companies. 
 
 This paper employs a VAR model to analyze the lead-lag relations between changes in 
bond spreads (BS), changes in CDS spreads (CDS) and changes in implied stock market 
credit spreads (ICS). Our analysis differs with respect to Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) 
and Zhu (2004) in that we explicitly consider the stock market as a third market in the 
analysis. It also differs with regards to Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2003) and Norden and 
Weber (2005) in that we deal with the price of credit risk also in the case of the stock market, 
and not only in the CDS and bond markets. In this sense, this is the first work in which a strict 
price discovery analysis is performed for the three markets simultaneously. This is important 
since credit spreads depend not only on the underlying value of the firm’s assets but also on 
other variables, the case of the risk-free rate being perhaps the most evident. If bond spreads 
or credit default swap spreads are related only to stock returns, then at least one key variable 
is being omitted. Although it would be feasible to follow an approach similar to Kwan (1996) 
and correct the linear model by incorporating changes in the risk-free rate in addition to stock 
returns, the theory suggests, and the evidence supports, the idea that the relationship between 
changes in credit spreads on one hand, and changes in variables such as the underlying assets 
or the risk-free rate on the other, is highly non-linear, with this non-linearity better 
represented by means of a structural model. Specifically, Di Cesare and Guazzarotti (2005) 
show that changes in CDSs are better explained by changes in the theoretical credit spreads 
predicted by Merton’s (1974) model, than by a linear model that accounts for changes in the 
underlying variables (leverage, risk-free rate and volatility). Consistent with this result, we 
find that the number of lead-lag relations between the stock market and the other two markets 
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is higher when changes in the implied stock market credit spreads are considered instead of 
stock returns.  
 
Also original to this paper is the consideration of different time periods in addition to 
different companies. This makes sense as the variables underlying the price discovery 
process, such as the different assets’ relative liquidity, may change not only from company to 
company for a given time period, but also over time within one company. Odders-White and 
Ready (2006) document for instance a negative relation between credit rating and stock 
liquidity, while a similar result arises in Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005) for the case of 
corporate bonds. 
 
Results of the price discovery analysis are consistent with the view that the stock 
market heads both the bond market and the CDS market, in terms of the credit risk price 
discovery process. This finding, which represents the second main contribution of the paper, 
proves to be robust to default barrier specification (calibrated or exogenously fixed), and to 
whether changes in the ICSs or stock returns are considered in the case of the stock market. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section I establishes the 
methodology with which the estimations in each market will be carried out and with which 
the price discovery analysis will be made; special attention is devoted to the credit risk price 
estimation in the case of the stock market. Section II describes the company sample. Section 
III analyzes the specific case of Ford Motor Credit Co., whilst Section IV extends the 
methodology to the full sample. Section V presents the robustness check, and lastly Section 
VI offers some conclusions and proposes future lines of research. 
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I.  Methodology 
A. Construction of Variables 
A.1. The CDS Market 
 
Let us begin with the CDS market, given that available data regarding this market will 
condition the methodology to be applied in the other two markets. 
 
A CDS establishes an annual premium λ, in the form of basis points on the nominal 
value of the insured debt as payment for the protection, as well as the contract maturity. 
Although this maturity may be between just a few months and more than 10 years, the 
development of the market has tended to adopt the 5 years contract. Let us therefore assume 
that we have a series of daily CDS-5y premiums for a given company nominated in local 
currency. In accordance with the arguments in the introduction, we will consider this annual 
premium the credit spread estimated by CDS market participants. Therefore: 
 
 ( ) TtCDS tt ...,,1;5 == λ  (1) 
 
where ( )5tλ  is the CDS-5y premium for day t.   
 
A.2. The Bond Market 
 
The credit spread is usually a function of debt maturity. In other terms, a particular 
market’s agents will not claim the same premium for bearing a given company’s credit risk 
for a month as they would for bearing the credit risk for 10 years. We have assumed that in 
the CDS market the price we have is what traders assign to bear credit risk for 5 years, and 
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therefore in order for our comparison to make sense, we must obtain the corresponding price 
in the bond market. However, although daily swap rates for 5 years are readily available, we 
rarely observe yields on corporate bonds that have exactly the same maturity. It is therefore 
necessary to perform an estimation of this constant yield for 5 years based upon the available 
bond prices.  
 
Following the ideas of Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) we will look for two bonds, 
which have the following characteristics: 
 
1. Designated in local currency. 
2. Without special clauses, such as a buyback clause. 
3. One of the bonds throughout the period of reference (the period for which we have 
information of CDSs) has a maturity of less than 5 years but more than 1 year, whilst the 
other has a maturity of more than 5 years for the whole period. 
4. Given the above characteristics, they are the most recently issued bonds and those that 
have maturity closer to 5 years. 
 
Carrying out a linear interpolation between the two bonds’ yields, it is possible to 
obtain an estimated series of yields for 5 years. 
 
It is appropriate to restrict the bond to a maturity of less than 5 years and at the same 
time greater than 1 year, since, as the maturity is closer to zero, bond yields may remain 
constant, tend toward zero, or increase substantially depending on their credit rating, which 
would make the linear interpolation particularly inappropriate if we were to work with bonds 
that expire very quickly. With the same objective of minimising the effects of the linear 
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interpolation, we will select those bonds that have maturity closer to 5 years. We finally select 
the most recently issued bonds, as they are generally the most liquid. If ( )5ty  is the yield for 5 
years obtained for day t, and ( )5str  is the corresponding swap rate (5 years and in local 
currency), then the estimated series of credit spreads in the bond market is: 
 
 ( ) ( ) TtryBS sttt ...,,1;55 =−=  (2) 
 
A.3. The Stock Market 
A.3.1. Modifying the LT Model 
 
In the case of the stock market, as already mentioned, we will consider a modified 
version of Leland and Toft (1996). Following the LT model, we assume that the value of the 
company’s assets evolves in accordance with the diffusion process expressed as: 
 
 ( ) VdzVdtdV σδµ +−=  (3) 
 
where µ  is the expected assets return, δ  is the fraction of the assets value dedicated to 
payment to investors, σ  is the volatility of the assets return, and z is a standard Brownian 
motion process. If failure occurs on V reaching a specific critical point BV , then the results 
obtained by LT imply that at any t the value of a bond with maturity τ , principal ( )τp , 
coupon ( )τc , and which receives a fraction ( )τρ  of the value of the company’s assets in the 
event of default, is expressed as: 
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 In the original model, LT find a closed expression for BV  as an endogenous result. It is 
specifically the assets’ value that stockholders consider to be the optimum value for declaring 
a company bankrupt, and leaving it in the hands of the creditors. It may be preferable not to 
use this expression for various reasons: Firstly, because it is based on the hypothesis that the 
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company issues debt always with the same principal, coupon and maturity, which can be an 
overly restrictive hypothesis. Most importantly, because many other factors such as liquidity 
constraints (Davydenko (2005)), or the specific insolvency code that would be applied to the 
company in case of default (Franks, Nyborg and Torous (1996)), may determine the point of 
bankruptcy instead of stockholders’ wishes. Our alternative is to express the default point as a 
fraction β  of the nominal value of the total debt issued P,5 and to calibrate this parameter 
according to the information available in the CDS (or bond) market. The exact procedure is 
discussed in the next section. At this point we simply state that under this assumption the term 
( ) BVτρ  in equations (4) - (6) is expressed as ( ) Pβτρ . 
 
Let us assume that all the bonds have the same priority and therefore, in the event of 
bankruptcy, each creditor receives (after taking into account the possible costs of liquidation) 
the part that reflects their participation in the company’s total debt. If liquidation costs, or 
bankruptcy costs, represent a fraction [ ]1,0∈α  of the assets’ value, then 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
P
p τατρ −= 1  (7) 
 
and therefore, what each creditor will finally receive in the event of bankruptcy is 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )τβαβτρ pP −= 1  (8) 
 
now leaving formula (4) as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )τττβατττττ τ G
r
cpF
r
cpe
r
ctVd r 

 −−+−

 −+= − 11,,  (9) 
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Please note that the recovery rate is ( )βα−1 . 
 
 The total value of the debt is the value of all the company’s bonds. Let us suppose that 
the company has N issued bonds, being iτ  the maturity of the i–th bond for Ni ...,,1= . Then 
 
 ( ) ( )∑
=
=
N
i
i tVdtVD
1
,,, τ  (10) 
 
where ( )tVd i ,,τ  corresponds to equation (9). 
 
 On the other hand, LT make a distinction between the market value of the company’s 
assets and the market value of the same assets with leverage. As Goldstein, Ju and Leland 
(2001) state, such a distinction presents various difficulties, some as obvious as assuming that 
the equity capital value is an increasing function of the tax rate. We therefore prefer to use the 
alternative approach of the latter authors. The idea is that the value of the company’s assets, 
indebted or not, should reflect the present value of all future cash flows that the company 
might generate, and that these cash flows would not be affected by leverage. On the contrary, 
the only thing this leverage does is to modify how these flows, and therefore the company 
value, are distributed between those agents who have rights to the cash flows. In this way, a 
company without debt is shared between shareholders and Government, where the 
Government acquires rights to the cash flows in the form of taxes. If the company issues debt, 
then there are four agents that have rights to the cash flows: the shareholders, the creditors, 
the Government and the ‘lawyers’, who receive part of the company’s income in the event of 
bankruptcy. In order to simplify things, let us assume there are no taxes. Then, and in 
accordance with the previous arguments, the following relation for any t has to be met: 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tVBCtVDtVStV ,,, ++=  (11) 
 
where ( )tVS ,  and ( )tVBC ,  represent the market value of the equity capital and of the 
lawyer’s fees in case of default, or simply bankruptcy costs, respectively6. Continuing with 
our line of reasoning that the indebtedness does not alter the value of the company but only its 
distribution, the existence of bankruptcy costs has the sole effect of transferring value from 
the creditors to the lawyers, who, to the detriment of the creditors, receive part of the 
company’s value in the event of bankruptcy7. Therefore: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )tVDtVDtVBC ,0|,, −== α ( ) ( )∑
=
=
N
i
ii Gp
1
τταβ  (12) 
 
Finally, we can use the formulas (11) and (12) to express ( )tVS ,  as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )0|,, =−= αtVDtVtVS  (13) 
 
A.3.2. Model Calibration 
 
Credit spreads from the stock market at time t, could be estimated from equation (9) as 
the resulting premium from issuing at par value a hypothetical bond with maturity equal to 5 
years. This bond should pay a coupon so that the following equation holds: 
 
 ( ) pptVd =,5,  (14.a) 
 
Noting this coupon as ( )pct ,5 , the bond yield is 
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 ( ) ( )
p
pcy tEt
,5
5 =  (14.b) 
 
and the estimated credit spread from the stock market is then the difference between the yield 
of this hypothetical bond and the risk-free rate: 
 
 ( ) tEtt ryICS −= 5  (14.c) 
 
However, such a procedure requires, at each instant t, availability of information 
regarding: 
 
I.1. Company value tV . 
I.2. Nominal value of total debt tP . 
I.3. Risk-free rate tr . 
I.4. Pay-out rate tδ . 
I.5. Asset Volatility tσ . 
I.6. Bankruptcy costs tα . 
I.7. Default point indicator tβ . 
 
Parameters and variables which in the majority of cases are not observable, and which 
should therefore be calibrated. 
 
We will assume from now on that bankruptcy costs, volatility of assets and default 
point indicator, are constant parameters8. It is possible that the hypothesis of constant 
volatility may appear particularly controversial. We find it, however, appropriate to apply an 
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estimator of the long-run volatility instead of the short-run volatility when it comes to pricing 
a bond over a five year horizon. On the other hand, we should bear in mind that σ  represents 
the volatility of the company’s total assets, not of the equity capital, and that the hypothesis of 
constant assets’ volatility is compatible with stochastic volatility in equity capital given that 
the company maintains debt between its financial sources. 
 
With the objective of compiling the information described in points I.1 – I.7, we 
obtain the following information: 
 
D.1. Daily data on stock market capitalization. 
D.2. Accounting data referring to: 
 
D.2.1. Short-term liabilities (STL). 
D.2.2. Long-term liabilities (LTL). 
D.2.3. Interest Expenses (IE). 
D.2.4. Cash Dividends (CD). 
 
Given that accounting data cannot be obtained on a daily basis, it is necessary to carry 
out an interpolation between available observations (normally on a quarterly, bi-annual or 
annual basis), with the objective of collecting the evolution of these variables over time. 
 
Total liabilities (TL) are the sum of short-term liabilities and long-term liabilities. We 
can therefore approximate Pt as: 
  
TtTLP tt ...,,1; ==  (15) 
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At the same time, we may express tδ  as a function of total asset value at t, as well as 
payments of dividends and interests: 
 
 Tt
V
IECD
t
tt
t ...,,1; =+=δ  (16) 
 
To estimate the series of assets’ value tV , as well as the volatility σ , we will make 
use of formula (13). It is worth noting now that such a formula includes the total value of debt 
without bankruptcy costs, and that the formula that expresses this is constructed from the 
characteristics of the company’s individual bonds. It is therefore necessary to interpret 
available information on debt (short and long-term liabilities, as well as interest payments) in 
terms of individual bonds. 
 
One possibility is to assume that debt consists of two bonds, one with nominal value 
equal to short-term liabilities, and another with nominal value equal to long-term liabilities. 
However, considering all debt reduced to just two instruments may make results largely 
dependent on the choice of their maturity. Our alternative is to assume that in each instant t 
there are 10 company bonds in the market: one with maturity of 1 year and principal equal to 
short-term liabilities tSTL , and nine with maturity from 2 to 10 years, each with principal 
equal to 1/9 of long-term liabilities tLTL . Stohs and Mauer (1996) consider a wide sample of 
companies and find that 95% of total debt has maturity under 10 years. The proposed 
procedure offers the advantage of assuming that debt repayment is made in a relatively 
homogenous way, and throughout a period that reasonably corresponds to the literature. 
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The next step will be to assign to each of those bonds an annual coupon that represents 
a fraction of tIE , proportional to the weight of its nominal value to the nominal value of total 
debt. Thus, debt’s total value without bankruptcy costs is given in each moment t by (10) 
under the restriction 0=α , where 10=N . Furthermore, we will need to collect the following 
information: 
 
D.3. Daily data on the swap rate for years 1 to 10, that is, ( ) 10...,,1; =ττstr . 
 
This in turn provides us with the rate to apply in (14): 
 
 ( ) Ttrr stt ...,,1;5 ==  (17) 
 
Following this we should determine the parameters α , σ  and β , as well as the series 
tV . Let us assume we already have values for α  and β . In this case we could calibrate the 
series tV  and the parameter σ  using the following algorithm: 
 
1) Propose an initial value for σ , 0σ .9 
2) Evaluate the series Vt , so that (13) is fulfilled for all t. 
3) Estimate the volatility of tV , 1σ , from the series obtained in 2. 
4) Conclude if 01 σσ = . Otherwise, propose 1σ  at step 1 and repeat until convergence. 
 
This procedure generates (for a given value of β ), a value for σ  and a series tV , 
which are consistent with observed stock market capitalization. In brief, 
 
 26
 ( ) ( )TtVTtV tt ,...,1;,,...,1;, =≡= σσ Is the solution of the algorithm (18) 
 
We could therefore obtain implied credit risk premiums in accordance with (14), 
although this still requires us to specify α  and β . We proceed by setting a value for α, 
specifically: 
 
 3.0=α  (19) 
 
which is in accordance with the literature10.  
 
It seems reasonable, on the other hand, to believe that the higher the credit spread 
level, the greater the discrepancy between spreads provided by different markets11. The 
relationship between stock market’s based credit spreads and observed CDS premiums could 
be therefore given by the expression: 
  
 teCDSICS tt
ε×=  (20) 
 
where tε  are i.i.d. error terms with [ ] 0=tE ε  and ( ) εσε =tVar . A reasonable measure of the 
discrepancy between these series is then The Mean Squared Error: 
 
 ∑
= 


= T
t
t
t
CDS
ICS
T
MSE
1
2
log1  (21) 
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Since it seems unreasonable to expect significant differences between credit spreads 
coming form different markets, we may define β  as the value of the default point indicator, 
which minimizes this measure of discrepancy between credit spreads, that is12: 
 
 ( )MSE
β
β argmin≡  (22) 
 
It is important to note that the choice of β  using (22) does not guarantee a perfect 
adjustment between the ICS series on one hand and the CDS series on the other, in the same 
way that carrying out a linear regression does not guarantee an R-squared adjustment of 
100%. Therefore, to apply such an adjustment does not prevent us from extracting 
conclusions about the validity of the model with respect to its capacity to generate ICS series, 
which are consistent with the CDS series whenever the obtained value for β  is reasonable. 
Secondly, β  modifies the general level of the ICSs, but not the sign of changes in that 
variable. This is important since it implies that the results of the price discovery analysis will 
be generally robust to a moderate bias in the estimation of β . 
 
In summary, stock market-based credit spread estimation uses formula (14). The 
arguments in (14) (described in points I.1 – I.7) can be evaluated from data mentioned in D.1 
– D.3, and formulae (14) - (22). 
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B. Analysis of Price Discovery 
 
Once the BS, CDS and ICS series are constructed, we may establish the following 
VAR model for changes in credit spreads: 
 
 t
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where the errors ite  are i.i.d., and where Zi for 3,2,1=i  may be defined according to the 
Schwarz criterion. Price discovery analysis is then carried out testing the null hypothesis that 
present changes in one given market are independent of past changes in another market. For 
example, if using the Wald test the null hypothesis 0...
111211
==== Zccc  is rejected, but we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that 0...
222221
==== Zbbb , then we have evidence that the 
CDS market incorporates new information about company credit risk faster than the bond 
market. Repeating this analysis for all possible cases we will finally obtain general 
conclusions about the price discovery process in the three markets. Additionally, we will 
carry out the Granger causality test for each couple of series. To do this we will consider one 
of the three possible couples of series and will establish the VAR model excluding the 
remaining series. We will then obtain the number of optimum lags according to the Schwarz 
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criterion for the VAR model, and will carry out the causality test. We will repeat this 
procedure for the three possible couples of series. 
 
II. Data Description 
A. The CDSs Market 
 
Our initial sample of CDSs contains daily data about 5-year premiums for 52 North 
American and European non-financial companies. This information has been provided by 
Banco Santander and spans the period from September 12th 2001 to June 25th 2003. We 
exclude those firms located in European countries that do not belong to the single currency 
zone, as the available CDSs for these companies are those designated in euros. 
 
B. The Bond Market 
 
Corporate bond yields satisfying Section I.A.2. requirements, as well as 5-year swap 
rates both in dollars and euros, are collected from Datastream.  
 
C. The Stock Market 
 
Stock market capitalization and accounting data have been obtained from Standard & 
Poor’s from January 2nd 2001 to June 30th 2003. For some companies accounting data has 
been completed using available information from Datastream. The swap rate, as for the bond 
market, has been taken from Datastream, with maturities ranging from 1 to 10 years. 
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D. Implementation and Additional Limitations 
 
The general procedure to estimate the ICSs from the stock market series described in 
section I.A.3., is implemented in our case following the next steps: 
 
I. Accounting data in each moment t is determined through linear interpolation between 
data on January 2nd 2001 and June 30th 2003. 
 
II. We divide the sample period into natural half-yearly periods, allowing the parameter β  
to be adjusted for each of those periods. We therefore have a maximum of 4 observations 
for each company, that is, 01/2 (year 2001 / 2nd half, with observations only starting from 
September 12th), 02/1, 02/2 and 03/1 (with observations only until June 25th). Those 
companies for which there is no information for at least 3 consecutive periods have been 
eliminated, and no half-yearly period is included if it does not have at least 50 
observations. These additional limitations leave us with a final sample of 21 companies 
and 25,371 daily data points. The total number of price discovery tests to be performed is 
65, corresponding to an equal number of firm-period observations. 
 
III. Once the companies that form our sample and the periods that will be included for each 
one are defined, we make a first estimation of β , 0301−β , assuming that it is constant 
throughout all periods. 
 
It is important to realize that a change in β  has two contrary effects over the mean 
level of the ICS series that we intend, somehow, to adjust to the mean level of the CDS series. 
On one hand there is a default probability effect (DPE), because a higher β  implies a higher 
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default point and therefore, a higher default probability and a higher mean level for the ICS 
series. On the other hand there is a recovery rate effect (RRE), which follows from the fact 
that a higher β  implies a higher recovery rate and a lower mean level for the series. To see 
which effect dominates the other, and when, let us start by considering the limit case 0=β . 
For this value of β  the recovery rate in case of default is zero, but because there is a null 
probability for this event (as the barrier is also at zero), all points of the ICS series will be 
equal to zero. An increase in β  generates positive credit risk premiums, that is, for small 
values of β , the DPE dominates the RRE. As β  increases the RRE tends to be higher, and 
eventually dominates the DPE. In the other limit case ( )αβ −= 1/1 , the default probability is 
‘very high’, but as the recovery rate is equal to 1 there is no credit risk, so all points of the 
ICS series are again equal to zero. 
 
 In brief, the mean level of the ICS series is a concave function of β  that takes value 
zero for 0=β  and ( )αβ −= 1/1 . Therefore when searching values for β  using (22), we may 
find two quite different solutions depending on the starting value for the search: Either a small 
β , which implies a small default probability, but with a recovery rate ( )βα−1  that is also 
small, or a large β , which implies a high default probability but, also a large recovery rate. 
This large β  is typically above 1, which is not rational from the point of view of 
shareholders13. For this reason we apply the following procedure with the objective of 
ensuring a more reasonable first solution (in which the DPE dominates the RRE): 
 
III.1. Choose an initial value that is sufficiently small for 0301−β , 0β  (specifically 0.3), and 
define 05.001 += ββ . 
III.2. Evaluate )( 00 βMSEMSE =  and )( 11 βMSEMSE = . 
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III.3. If 01 MSEMSE < , then define again 0β  as 10 ββ =  and go back to step III.1. 
III.4. If 01 MSEMSE ≥ , then look for the value of β  that minimizes the MSE in the interval 
)05.0,05.0( 00 +− ββ . 
 
It must be pointed out that each proposal for β  implies a new estimation of the 
volatility of tV , ( )βσ .14 For this estimation we use all available information, that is, stock 
market capitalization series and accounting data from 2nd January 2001 to the last date for 
which we have simultaneously available BS and CDS data. This means making the 
assumption that this value of β  is also applicable to the period for which we have data from 
the stock market but not from the other markets. 
 
IV. Once 0301−β  is estimated, we can use its value as an initial guess for the estimation of the 
vector { }1/032/021/022/01 ,,, βββββ =s . Again, each proposal of a vector sβ  implies a new 
estimation of the volatility15.  For those periods in which we only have information about 
the stock market we apply the closest (in time) value for β .  
 
III. The Ford Motor Credit Co. Case 
 
In order to validate the model we need to check whether or not it is capable of 
generating credit spreads that are consistent with those obtained in the bond and CDS markets 
for reasonable parameter values. It is evident that such verification will be more reliable the 
more we trust the information obtained from those markets. Because of this, we begin the 
analysis by focusing on the specific case of Ford Motor Credit Company. Ford Motor 
Company bonds, which represent around 10% of the North American bond market (Chen, 
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Lesmond and Wei (2005)), are among the most liquid in this market, and the CDSs that have 
these bonds as reference are also among the most liquid in the CDS market. Moreover, results 
in Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) are indicative of the absence of non-default 
components in both bond and CDS spreads for this company. 
 
Figure 1 graphs BS, CDS and ICS time series for Ford Motor Credit Co16.  Panel A of 
Table I shows the value of the estimated parameters in this case, as well as the resulting MSE 
adjustment of ICS and CDS series. The constant β  is 0.93 and asset volatility is around 5%. 
When β  is assumed to be constant the recovery rate ( )βα−1  is also constant and equal to 
0.65. 
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
<Table I about here> 
 
Panel B shows descriptive statistics of the three series, whilst Panel C collects 
measures of discrepancy usually considered in the literature: average basis (avb), percent 
average basis (avb(%)), average absolute basis (avab) and percent average absolute basis 
(avab(%)). The data confirms what is evident at first glance in the graph, a good adjustment 
between the different series. Particularly notable is the consistency between estimated credit 
spreads from the stock market and estimated credit spreads from the other two markets, 
obtained through reasonable values of unobserved parameters (Panel A). 
 
Panel D shows the results of a first analysis of price discovery for each half-yearly 
period. The number of optimum lags for each equation of the model varies between 1 and 2 
according to the Schwarz criterion. Likewise, t-statistic or F-statistic is shown from the Wald 
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test for the null hypothesis that coefficients of explanatory variables are all equal to zero. The 
Panel also shows F-statistic that summarizes overall significance of each equation. The main 
conclusion from this Panel is that, in the case of Ford Motor Credit Co., and for the 
considered period, the stock market clearly headed the other markets in the incorporation of 
new information on the company’s credit risk, without a clear leader pattern between bond 
market and CDS market. Results are confirmed in Panel E where Granger causality tests for 
the distinct couples of time series are shown. The number of optimum lags for each VAR 
model also varies between 1 and 2. It is worth noting here that differences between half-
yearly periods eventually appear. For instance, the CDS market seemed to lead the bond 
market in the second half of 2001, and not headed by the stock market during the first half of 
2003. This is indicative of a time varying feature in the price discovery process. 
 
IV. Results for the Full Sample 
 
We now extend the analysis to the total sample of 21 companies. Table II contains 
descriptive statistics, whilst Table III shows the distinct measures of discrepancy between 
series. Of the 21 companies, one stands out for the apparent excessive size of the MSE 
(1.2619). This company is the Spanish Petroleum Company, Repsol YPF SA. Figure 2 shows 
BS, CDS and ICS time series for this company. It is evident that the general level of ICS 
series is systematically below BS and CDS series. A detailed study of the company’s 
circumstances reveals an interesting situation: As Standard & Poor’s report of 26 March 2002 
indicates, part of Repsol YPF SA’s debt (8,000 million euros) was (at least at that time) 
subject to a clause that allowed creditors to declare the debt in default if the Argentinean 
subsidiary company YPF SA failed to pay its debt by an amount superior to 20 million 
dollars. This clause has the incentive effect on Repsol YPF SA to financially support YPF 
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SA. Moreover, Standard and Poor’s remarked on the individual nature of this clause between 
European debt issuers. The effect that this clause may have on bond spreads of Repsol YPF 
SA and on CDSs traded on these bonds is remarkable (whether they are affected by this 
clause or not). We have decided therefore to eliminate this company from our sample. 
 
<Table II about here> 
<Table III about here> 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 
The company with the next largest MSE (0.1464) is Telecom Italia SPA. Although 
this MSE is not substantially greater than the values found in other companies, it is relevant 
that this company, together with Repsol YPF SA, is the only company to have a percentual 
average basis of two digits (-20%). It must be highlighted that this firm merged with Olivetti 
just a few months after our sample period, with news about the merger going back to 2001. 
Figure 3 shows CDS series for Telecom Italia SPA as well as CDS series for Olivetti. It is 
clear that, as the merger came closer, convergence of CDSs for the two companies could be 
observed. It seems reasonable to assume that the risk of the company that would result from 
the merger was being represented more and more by the CDSs of Telecom Italia SPA 
throughout our sample period, and that the CDSs represented less of the associated risk 
particular to the company’s own financial situation. As in the case of Repsol YPF SA, the 
CDS market reflects in its premiums information that, being relevant in order to evaluate the 
credit risk of the company is not completely included in the evolution of the stock market 
capitalization nor in its accounts, but depends to some extent on the financial information of 
another company. We have decided therefore to also eliminate Telecom Italia SPA from the 
sample. 
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<Figure 3 about here> 
 
The last company that we will eliminate is Royal Ahold. Figure 4 shows the three 
series of credit spreads for this firm. The leap at the end of February 2003 may be related to 
published information about accounting irregularities in its American subsidiary Foodservice. 
It is noteworthy to verify how the three markets react jointly (although in different magnitude) 
to this information. In spite of the interest generated by this case, and in order to prevent any 
possible bias in the general results, we prefer to remove this company from the sample. 
 
<Figure 4 about here> 
 
Tables II and III show averages for the 21 original companies, as well as averages that 
come from eliminating the three firms mentioned. Looking at Table III, Panel C, we find that 
the avb between ICSs and CDSs for the remaining 18 companies is always in the range of +/-
10 b.p., with the sole exception of Alcatel (-11.26 b.p.), the firm with the highest mean levels 
(Table II). The mean value of the avb is actually negligible (-0.45 b.p.). Of course it could be 
the case that the structural model was able to replicate the mean level of the CDSs through the 
calibration of β , whilst at the same time it fails in the precision over time series. This 
however is not the picture described by avab, with a mean value of 29.96 b.p., quite similar to 
the avab between CDSs and BSs found by Houweling and Vorst (2005) which is around 32 
b.p.. Our results suggest that the structural model and the calibration methodology proposed 
in the paper generate ICSs that are, according to the literature, at least as good as bond 
spreads for explaining observed CDS premiums. 
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Panel A in Table III shows that BSs tend to be below CDSs (positive CDS/BS avb), 
which is consistent with results in Houweling and Vorst (2005) and Blanco, Brennan and 
Marsh (2005). This may indicate that cheapest-to-deliver option premium in CDS spreads is 
on average higher than liquidity premium in bond yields (a liquidity premium we tried to 
minimize in our sample). The mean avab found between CDSs and BSs is, on the other hand, 
42.81 b.p., slightly above estimates in Houweling and Vorst (2005). Results however 
converge when the atypical avab of Fiat, a firm with a well known cheapest-to-deliver option 
premium in its CDSs, is eliminated (our mean avab falls to 32.31 b.p.) 17. 
 
Finally, when comparing ICSs and BSs (Panel B), results are very close to those that 
emerge from a comparison between CDSs and BSs. This is a natural consequence of fitting 
ICS series to CDS series. 
 
 Table IV contains the parameter values that emerge from the estimation of ICS series 
where the three suspect companies are excluded from our original sample of 21. Looking at 
Panel A, which reflects the results of the first stage of the estimate, in which a constant β  is 
assumed, the mean default point indicator is 0.79 and the associated mean recovery rate 0.55, 
very much in line with the historical average. On the other hand, the close relationship shown 
in Figure 5 between default point indicator and volatility stands out. Carrying out a linear 
regression in which the independent variable is ( )0301−βσ  and the dependent variable is 
0301−β , a negative slope is obtained which is significant at 1%. This is in line with predictions 
by structural models with endogenous bankruptcy. Interestingly, ( )0301−βσ  alone explains 
85% of the variability of 0301−β . 
 
<Table IV about here> 
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<Figure 5 about here> 
 
The value of β  is at times slightly greater than 1, which is not strictly consistent with 
the hypothesis of stockholders’ rationality. This is probably a consequence of the cheapest-to 
deliver option in CDS premiums we employ in the calibration. In effect we have the case in 
which, ceteris paribus, the higher the premiums we want to replicate, the higher the value of 
β  we obtain (as the DPE dominates the RRE). For this reason, if the actual credit spread is to 
some extent overestimated by CDS premiums, then so is the value we derive for β . The case 
of Fiat represents a good example. We find however that values obtained for β  are in general 
reasonable and in accordance with the hypothesis of stockholders’ rationality, both from the 
point of view of the levels and from the point of view of their relationship with the firm’s 
asset volatility. 
 
Table V contains the results of the price discovery analysis. Panel A shows rejections 
of different null hypotheses in terms of the total number of companies and half-yearly periods 
in our sample. For example, Column A1 indicates that for 40 cases over 65 (62%) the null 
hypothesis stating that past changes in BSs are not important for explaining current changes in 
BSs is rejected at the 95% level of significance. From Panel A it can be seen that, for our 
sample, the most predictable market is the bond market (50 rejections of the null hypothesis 
of no significance of the model), followed by the CDS market (35) and lastly the stock 
market, being the least predictable (7 rejections). On 25 occasions, past changes in CDSs are 
important for explaining current changes in BSs, and on 18 occasions past changes in BSs are 
important for explaining current changes in CDSs. This lack of clear leadership between bond 
and CDS markets is confirmed by carrying out the Granger causality test.  
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This test is in Panel B. Looking at Column B1, where the stock market is exclueded, 
we observe that in 25 cases the null hypothesis that changes in BSs do not cause, in Granger’s 
sense, changes in CDSs, is rejected. The contrary hypothesis is rejected for exactly the same 
number of cases. This general pattern appears however as the result, not of an equal 
importance of both markets over time, but of a rotating leading role of these. As an example, 
the bond market seemed to lead the CDS market during the first half of 2002, whilst the 
contrary happened during the second half of the same year. 
 
For ICSs, we may see (Panel A) that only in 8 (5) cases the hypothesis that past 
changes in BSs (CDSs) are important for explaining current changes in ICSs is rejected. 
Similarly we observe that in 19 (24) cases, the hypothesis that past changes in ICSs help to 
explain current changes in BSs (CDSs) is rejected. The overall impression is that the stock 
market is leading the other two markets in most cases, a result that appears independent of the 
time period considered. 
 
<Table V about here> 
 
V. Robustness Check 
 
It may be the case that previous results are biased because of the particular form in 
which we measure changes in the perception of credit risk in the stock market. In particular, it 
is possible that the use of CDS series to calibrate the default barrier is affecting the 
conclusions. To check this possibility we repeat the analysis imposing an exogenously fixed 
value for β  of 0.73 (Leland (2004)). Table VI contains the results of the new price discovery 
analysis. These indicate that main conclusions on the leading role of the stock market are 
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robust to the specification of the default boundary. Table VII on the other hand reflects the 
new values for the different measures of the basis. Imposing a constant 0.73 for the default 
point indicator (close to the mean of 0.79 we get from the calibration) implies a relatively low 
mean avb (-33.35 b.p. when new ICSs are compared with CDSs, 5.28 when compared with 
BSs), but with a large dispersion around this mean. The result reveals the importance of the 
default barrier for precision in determining the credit spread within the structural model. 
 
<Table VI about here> 
<Table VII about here> 
 
As a final robustness check, we follow Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2003) and Norden 
and Weber (2005), and use stock returns instead of changes in ICSs for the case of the stock 
market. The objective is to verify whether our findings still hold under this more standard 
approach. Two main conclusions emerge from results in Table VIII: Firstly, the stock market 
still appears as the leading market under this alternative specification. Secondly, the number 
of statistically significant lead-lag relations between the stock market on one hand, and the 
bond and CDS markets on the other, falls with respect to the case in which changes in ICSs 
are considered. As an example, the Granger causality test indicates that in just 1 (6) case(s) 
past changes in CDSs (BSs) are important for explaining current stock returns. This happened 
in 5 (8) occasions when changes in ICSs where considered (see Table III). In the same way, 
past stock returns appear important for explaining current changes in CDSs (BSs) in 27 (19) 
cases, whilst in the previous analysis this type of dependence appeared in 29 (22) out of 65 
possible cases. 
 
<Table VIII about here> 
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To summarize, we find that the stock market leads bond and CDS markets in the credit 
risk discovery process. This result is robust to default barrier specification (calibrated from 
CDS data or exogenously set). The result is also robust to the use of stock returns or changes 
in ICSs for the analysis. Of all these possible formulations, the one proposed in this paper is 
that which enables a better representation of the dynamic relationship between the stock 
market and the other two markets. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
Credit risk is a fundamental element in bond, CDS and stock prices. These assets are 
traded in markets that differ greatly in terms of organization, liquidity and traders, which can 
give rise to new information on credit risk being incorporated into the price of some assets 
more quickly than into others. This paper establishes a methodology that allows the analysis 
of which markets incorporate this information first, and applies the methodology to a sample 
of North American and European companies. 
 
We begin with a formal definition of credit risk: risk due to losses associated with the 
event of failure to pay by the borrower, or the event of deterioration of its credit rating. We 
then propose a measure of this risk in accordance with the definition given: the credit spread, 
or premium that agents of a certain market would claim for the debt with a possibility of 
default by a certain company, in relation to a debt of the same nature, but with no possibility 
of default. As a next step we define the form in which such a variable can be estimated for 
each market based on the available information. More specifically, we establish that credit 
spreads in the bond market can be measured by the differential between the yield on corporate 
bonds and the corresponding swap rate. In the CDS market, by observed CDS premiums, and 
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in the stock market, by the theoretical premium generated by a modified version of the Leland 
and Toft (1996) model. Here the distinction between the value of the levered assets and the 
non-levered assets of a company is avoided, and the default boundary is determined based on 
the available information in other markets.  
 
From the application of our methodology to the sample, it is deduced that the proposed 
modification of the Leland and Toft (1996) model generates implied credit spreads in the 
stock market which are consistent with estimated credit spreads in other markets. This allows 
us, for the first time in the literature as far as we know, to present comparable estimates of the 
credit spread from the three markets. On carrying out a linear regression in which default 
point indicator acts as a dependent variable and asset volatility acts as an independent 
variable, we find a negative and significant relationship in line with what was established by 
structural models with endogenous default. Volatility alone explains 85% of the variability of 
the (constant) indicator point of bankruptcy in our sample.  
 
The price discovery analysis is carried out by means of a VAR model for daily credit 
spread changes in each of the three markets. Results indicate that in most cases the stock 
market headed the other two markets, with no clear pattern of leadership between the bond 
and CDS markets. Even though the leading role of the stock market is shown as robust to the 
time period considered, the equal importance of the bond and CDS markets may be affected 
when looking at specific time periods. As an example, the bond market seemed to lead the 
CDS market in our sample during the first half of 2002, whilst the inverse situation took place 
during the second half of the same year. 
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Future work should verify the results obtained here using a larger sample of 
companies and time periods. This would also allow the validation of the proposed structural 
model as well as the calibration procedure employed. It must be remembered that although 
the calibration is based on stock market capitalization and accounting information, we 
estimate the default point to make credit spreads from the stock market consistent with credit 
spreads estimated in the CDS market, or alternatively, in the bond market. In many cases 
however, information on credit spreads in these last two markets is either unavailable, 
difficult to find, or simply unreliable; and it will be precisely in these circumstances when the 
information on implied credit spreads from stock market is most valuable. In this sense the 
procedure we employ offers a clear advantage over reduced form models, even though both 
share the idea of calibrating model parameters to reflect credit risk premiums estimated in 
other markets. In effect, the default point indicator we obtain may be related to 
‘fundamentals’. It would be suitable therefore to study, based on companies for which 
sufficient information exists on these other markets, whether a functional relationship can be 
established between the default point indicator on one hand, and those fundamentals on the 
other, in a way that stock market credit spreads could be derived even in the absence of 
information about the spreads in other markets. The strong relationship found between default 
point indicator and firm’s asset volatility is a clear example and a first step in this direction. 
At the same time, recent studies have demonstrated the potential of the maximum likelihood 
estimation for the non-observed parameters in the structural models. Some examples would 
be the works of Duan, Gauthier, Simonato and Zaanoun (2003), Duan, Gauthier and Simonato 
(2004), Ericsson and Reneby (2004a, 2004b), and Bruche (2005). It would also be interesting 
to study the possible application of this method of estimation to the model proposed in this 
paper. All these possibilities are left for future research. 
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Footnotes 
                                                          
1 We could of course include central banks, whose objective is to ensure the health of the financial system. 
2 See Hull, Predescu and White (2004). 
3 In a recent paper Ericsson and Renault (2006) propose a structural model that incorporates both credit and 
liquidity risk. 
4 They likewise show that the proportion of the total premium represented by the estimated credit risk premium 
is greater when swap rates are used instead of Government bond yields as a measure of the risk-free rate.  
5 Leland (2004) demonstrates that when it comes to predicting default probabilities, it is equivalent to using the 
expression obtained in LT or the term βP for an adequate value of β.  
6 Of course identifying all the bankruptcy costs with lawyers’ fees is quite restrictive, but seems to be a useful 
way of considering such costs. It is interesting on the other hand to verify that when there are no taxes there is no 
‘formal’ contradiction between the approach of LT and that of Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001). If we identify 
the sum of the equity capital and debt as the market value of the company, this will be expressed as 
),()(),(),(),( tVBCtVtVDtVStVv −=+= , which is in line with the results of LT in the absence of taxes.  
However, now )(tV  will not be interpreted as the market value of the company’s assets that are not indebted, 
but instead, as the economic value of the company or the present value of all the cash flows that the company 
might generate.   
7 At the time of issuing debt, the existence of bankruptcy costs will result in creditors claiming a greater interest 
rate, implying an indirect loss for the shareholders.  
8 Although we consider β  as a constant in the sense that it does not vary in daily terms, it may be useful as we 
will see, to allow its value to be readjusted in monthly, quarterly, bi-annual or annual terms.      
9 Vassalou and Xing (2004) establish a similar procedure for calibrating the volatility in the Merton (1974) 
model, using the volatility of the equity capital as an initial proposal to derive the volatility of the company’s 
assets.  This is a reasonable way to proceed although not necessarily the most efficient: The volatility of equity 
capital will be greater than the company’s assets volatility anyway. Therefore, this procedure starts the search 
with a biased estimation of the volatility to be estimated. In our case we start from the value of 0.2, which is used 
in many calibration exercises. We have checked that, in any case, the result obtained is robust with regards to the 
initial proposed value. 
10 See Leland (2004). 
11 See, for example, Bruche (2005). 
12 Obviously the CS series could also be taken as reference in the calculation of β . 
13 A value of β  greater than 1 implies that the total assets value is greater than the total nominal value of the 
debt in the event of failure. In this case the stockholders could simply sell the assets, liquidate the debt, and be 
left with the surplus instead of leaving all assets in the hands of creditors and lawyers. 
14 See algorithm described in Section I.A.3. 
15 In this case we omit the leaps between each six month period to prevent a bias in the estimation of σ. 
16 The stock market data has been taken from the parent company Ford Motor Company. 
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17 For a discussion on the reasons behind the CDS/BS basis, and a detailed analysis of the case of Fiat, see 
Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005). 
β01/2   0.9419
β01−03    0.9375 β02/1   0.9407
(1−α)β01−03 0.6563 β02/2   0.9424
σ(β01−03) 0.0520 β03/1   0.9279
0.0518
MSE 0.0104
Min. Max. Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean S.D.
129.5 713.6 309.4 129.8 125.0 650.0 310.6 127.9 126.3 662.7 309.7 126.2
avb avb(%) avab avab (%) avb avb(%) avab avab (%) avb avb(%) avab avab (%)
1.15 0.60 15.36 5.36 0.31 0.82 25.43 8.56 -0.84 0.42 24.47 8.07
Table I 
A: CALIBRATION PARAMETRES
σ(β01/2−β03/1)
B: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Ford Motor Credit Co. This table has five panels. Panel A contains the calibration
parameters used in computing the ICS for Ford Motor Credit Co. Panel B shows
descriptive statistics for the three measures (BS, CDS and ICS) of credit spreads. Panel C
shows the basis for the three series. Panel D contains the results of the price discovery
exercice using the Wald test. Panel E contains the results of the Granger causality test. ***
Indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and *
indicates significance at the 10% level.
CDS vs BS ICS vs BS ICS vs CDS
BS CDS ICS
C: BASIS
∆BS-L ∆CDS-L ∆ICS-L MODEL ∆BS-L ∆CDS-L ∆ICS-L MODEL ∆BS-L ∆CDS-L ∆ICS-L MODEL
01/2 -1.48 2.34** 2.41** 5.99*** 0.04 -0.24 2.22** 1.81 0.96 -0.59 -0.86 0.66
02/1 -1.11 3.31*** 2.17** 5.48*** 18.21*** 7.70*** 2.92* 8.57*** 1.16 -0.14 -1.49 1.11
02/2 3.52*** -0.59 5.62*** 21.57*** 6.30*** -3.52*** 1.69* 17.44*** 0.09 -0.24 -2.04** 1.57
03/1 -1.86* 1.77* 7.53*** 20.65*** 23.54*** 2.90* 14.27*** 17.89*** -0.33 2.10** -0.30 1.49
01/2  BS dngc CDS 0.00  BS dngc ICS 0.59  CDS dngc ICS 0.01
 CDS dngc BS 11.14***  ICS dngc BS 11.52***  ICS dngc CDS 5.01**
02/1  BS dngc CDS 20.99***  BS dngc ICS 1.40  CDS dngc ICS 0.05
 CDS dngc BS 4.52**  ICS dngc BS 5.04**  ICS dngc CDS 4.33**
02/2  BS dngc CDS 30.49***  BS dngc ICS 0.00  CDS dngc ICS 0.05
 CDS dngc BS 2.88*  ICS dngc BS 31.72***  ICS dngc CDS 9.57***
03/1  BS dngc CDS 27.51***  BS dngc ICS 0.06  CDS dngc ICS 4.38**
 CDS dngc BS 2.80*  ICS dngc BS 57.10***  ICS dngc CDS 28.65***
D: PRICE DISCOVERY - WALD TEST
Table I Continued
VAR (∆BS,∆CDS) MODEL
∆BS
VAR (∆BS,∆ICS) MODEL VAR (∆CDS,∆ICS) MODEL
∆CDS ∆ICS
E: PRICE DISCOVERY - GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST
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Figure 1. BS, CDS and ICS series for Ford Motor Credit Co.
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Figure 2. BS, CDS and ICS series for Repsol YPF SA. 
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Figure 3. CDS series for Telecom Italia SPA and Olivetti. 
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Figure 4. BS, CDS and ICS series for Royal Ahold. 
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Figure 5. β01-03 vs σ(β01-03). This figure represents the constant default point indicator for
each firm vs. the associated total assets volatility.
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